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Abstract 
Prior studies report negative or insignificant relations between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity capital, 
arguing that conservatism reduces information risk. Using accounting-based conditional conservatism proxies, however, 
we find a significantly positive association between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity. This positive 
relation operates via improving information precision about negative earnings shocks and generally inflating 
information asymmetry among investors, both of which increase the cost of equity. We further find that the cost of 
equity effect of conditional conservatism disappears in the period after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 
consistent with the notion that nationwide improvement of information precision about negative news and diminished 
information asymmetry are engendered by the SOX regulation. This study adds to researches on conditional 
conservatism, SOX, and the cost of equity, and also has policy implications. 
Keywords: conditional conservatism, cost of equity capital, asset pricing test, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
1. Introduction 
Conditional conservatism is a longstanding feature of financial reporting characterized by the asymmetric timely 
recognition of bad earnings news relative to good news (Note 1). This more timely loss recognition has been explained 
as arising from debtholders’ demands for information regarding borrowers’ net liquidation values, thus enabling timely 
actions to protect debtholders’ interests. The contracting benefit of conservative accounting, however, may come at the 
expense of its valuation role especially in the stock market (Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010). Recently, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board [FASB] and the International Accounting Standards Board [IASB] have removed 
conservatism from their conceptual framework, arguing that conservative accounting induces information asymmetries 
that reduce shareholders’ insights into future cash flows from growth options. Johnstone (in press) analytically shows 
that even in cases where information does bring greater precision, the precision about bad news could lower expected 
payoffs and thus increase the equity financing cost. These arguments suggest that timely loss recognition may increase 
the cost of equity by affecting information precision and information asymmetry.  
Little prior evidence exists regarding this contention. However, several studies provide some hints about the possible 
information precision and information asymmetry effects of conditional conservatism. Ball, Jayaraman, and 
Shivakumar (2012) find that fair value accounting (FVA) increases information asymmetry; as conditional conservatism 
approximates FVA for net assets at bad times, the evidence suggests that conditional conservatism may similarly 
increase the cost of equity via enlarging information asymmetry. Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009) report that negative 
news released by management, analysts, and the business press increases the cost of capital, and Rogers, Skinner, and 
Buskirk (2009) document that sporadic managerial forecasts of unexpected bad news increase market uncertainty. Since 
conditional conservatism reveals unexpected negative news, it could possibly increase market risk and thus the cost of 
equity. Contrary to the implications of these studies, literatures on conditional conservatism and the cost of equity 
document either a negative relation (e.g., Li, 2010; Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma, & Penalva, 2011) or an insignificant one 
(e.g., Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004). Therefore, the association between conditional conservatism and the 
cost of equity capital is still an open empirical question.  
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This study is thus motivated to examine how conditional conservatism affects the cost of equity via the effects of 
information precision (i.e., more precisely revealing bad news) and information asymmetry. Most analytical studies 
demonstrate that conditional conservatism improves information quality by providing more accurate negative earnings 
signals (e.g., Gao, 2011; Fan & Zhang, 2012). The main argument is that increased information quality through timely 
bad earnings news reporting reduces investors’ uncertainty regarding expected future cash flows and the cost of equity 
capital (Guay & Verrecchia, 2007; Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2007), which underlies prior studies on the relation 
between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity. However, existing evidence fails to provide consistent 
empirical supports for this argument because both negative and insignificant conservatism-cost of capital relations are 
documented, as mentioned above. We propose that the lack of considerations in two dimensions of the implication of 
information quality may contribute to the mixed evidence. Specifically, improved information quality by conditional 
conservatism may generate both a precision effect via changing the average precision level of information and an 
asymmetry effect through increasing information asymmetry among market participants. With regard to the information 
precision effect, Johnstone (in press) states that although conditional conservatism increases information certainty, it 
conveys unexpected bad earnings news and lower expected payoffs, and a more precise revealing of bad news can 
increase the cost of equity. This suggests that the more precise bad news shocks are conveyed by conditional 
conservatism, the more possible that the relation between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity is positive. 
For the information asymmetry effect, existing studies ignore this channel because they assume an efficient and 
perfectly competitive equity market that only allows the information precision effect of conditional conservatism. 
Relaxing this assumption, conditional conservatism can also increase the cost of capital through the information 
asymmetry effect. In particular, despite enhancing information quality, conditional conservatism can nevertheless 
increase information asymmetry and heterogeneity of opinions among analysts and investors by inducing unexpected 
negative information shocks. Earlier theoretical works concur that accelerating public disclosures and enhancing 
information quality can trigger private information acquisition by sophisticated investors, which escalates information 
asymmetry among investors in general (Kim & Verrecchia, 1991; Demski & Feltham, 1994; McNichols & Trueman, 
1994). Recent theoretical and empirical studies argue and provide confirming evidence that enhanced information 
quality increases equity cost by generating the information asymmetry effect, especially when the market is less than 
perfectly competitive and/or illiquid (Armstrong, Core, Taylor, & Verrecchia, 2011; Gow, Taylor, & Verrecchia, 2011; 
Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2012). Consistently, several other studies report a positive relation between conditional 
conservatism and analyst forecast errors (Mensah, Song, & Ho, 2004; Louis, Lys, & Sun, 2014). Therefore, when the 
market is imperfect beyond a threshold, the information asymmetry effect of conditional conservatism may enhance the 
potential information precision effect in increasing equity cost, whereas in a more perfect market, the information 
asymmetry effect does not work. Overall, the above analysis suggests that the conditional conservatism and equity cost 
relation through information quality hinges on the combined effects of information precision and information 
asymmetry, which are to date empirically unexplored. 
To examine the relation between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity that operates via the information 
precision and information asymmetry effects, it is crucial to insulate the measures for conditional conservatism and the 
cost of equity from the influences of concurrent stock price information and cash flow shocks. Prior studies on this line 
of research use stock price-based conditional conservatism measures such as the Basu (1997) measure in Francis et al. 
(2004) and the CR ratio in Garcia Lara et al. (2011). These measures not only assume market efficiency and perfect 
competition, which are inconsistent with the tests for information effects of conditional conservatism, but also reflect 
cash flow news inherent in stock returns (Caskey & Petersen, 2009), which may induce a mechanical (possibly negative) 
relation between conditional conservatism and equity return (Note 2). These measurement issues are potentially (at least 
partially) responsible for the mixed findings about the association between conditional conservatism and the cost of 
equity in prior studies. To mitigate the confounding effects, we employ an alternative accounting-based conditional 
conservatism proxy – the average of accumulated non-operational accruals and earnings skewness – to provide clearer 
inferences regarding the informational effects of conservatism, following Basu (1995), Givoly and Hyan (2000), and 
Zhang (2008). We also control for the impacts of cash flow shocks induced by conditional conservatism, which are 
impounded into and decrease the realized stock return, a proxy for expected return and cost of equity capital often used 
in prior studies. Specifically, we adjust the realized excess return by concurrent cash flow news and use it as our 
measure for the cost of equity as suggested by Vuolteenaho (2002), McInnis (2010), Botosan, Plumlee, & Wen (2011), 
and Ogneva (2012) (Note 3). 
Utilizing standard asset pricing tests including hedging portfolio analyses and multivariate regressions based on these 
measures, we find a significant positive relation between conditional conservatism and the expected stock return 
adjusted for cash flow news. In particular, a hedging strategy for conditional conservatism-sorted portfolios earns 
significantly positive excess returns, and firm-level Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions yield significantly 
positive associations between conditional conservatism and future excess returns adjusted for cash flow news both 
Applied Finance and Accounting                                          Vol. 2, No. 1; 2016 
71 
before and after controlling for firm risk characteristics. Portfolio-level two-stage cross-sectional regressions further 
reveal that factor loadings on conditional conservatism are significantly positively associated with return spreads for 
conditional conservatism-sorted portfolios, implying that conditional conservatism is priced by market participants. 
These findings are in line with the notion that the effects of conditional conservatism on information precision and 
information asymmetry increase the cost of equity.  
We conduct additional analyses to provide more direct supporting evidence regarding the information precision and 
information asymmetry effects of conditional conservatism on the cost of equity. We use the bid-ask spread to capture 
the information asymmetry effect and the magnitude of earnings downside risk to capture the information precision 
effect regarding negative earnings shocks. We find that larger conditional conservatism is generally associated with 
higher information asymmetry and higher precision about earnings downside risk. In addition, controlling information 
asymmetry and/or precision about negative earnings shocks in Fama-MacBeth regressions substantially reduces the 
conditional conservatism coefficients, consistent with our proposition that information precision and information 
asymmetry effects of conditional conservatism at least partially explain the positive association between conditional 
conservatism and the cost of equity. 
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) offers a unique setting to further investigate the effects of 
information precision and information asymmetry on the positive relation between conditional conservatism and the 
cost of equity. SOX regulations are promulgated to increase financial reporting transparency, reduce information 
asymmetry, and improve market efficiency. In particular, the nationwide improvement of information precision about 
negative news and diminished information asymmetry engendered by SOX regulation holds the potential to mitigate the 
cross-sectional firm-specific effect of conditional conservatism on the cost of equity. We thus expect a weakened 
relation between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity following the enactment of SOX despite the fact that 
SOX increases conditional conservatism as shown in Lobo and Zhou (2006). Fama-MacBeth regressions for the periods 
before and after SOX give confirming evidence that the enhancing effect of conditional conservatism on the cost of 
equity has disappeared in the post-SOX period. 
This study contributes to literatures on accounting conservatism, the cost of equity capital and SOX, and holds policy 
implications. First, utilizing conditional conservatism measures net of the influences from stock market and cash flow 
shocks, we provide original evidence supporting the notion that conditional conservatism reveals more precise 
information about unexpected negative earnings shocks and reduces expected payoffs, and also generates new 
information asymmetry among investors, both of which ultimately dampen stock prices and enhance the cost of equity. 
Our study thus extends prior research that draws only on one facet of the information effect of conservatism and 
documents mixed evidence of negative or insignificant associations between conservatism and the cost of equity 
(Francis et al., 2004; Li, 2010; Garcia Lara et al., 2011). Differing from these studies, we provide an opposite finding 
using refined measures and testing methods via a more comprehensive perspective regarding the information quality 
effect of conservatism.  
Second, we provide evidence supporting Johnstone’s (in press) argument that more precise information about bad 
earnings news can increase the cost of equity capital. We further identify information asymmetry as a channel for the 
observed positive relation between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity, which extends prior studies on the 
asset pricing effect of information asymmetry (Armstrong et al., 2011; Gow et al., 2011; Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 
2012). This also adds to the literature on the relation between conservatism and information asymmetry. Watts (2003), 
LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008), and LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that accounting conservatism mitigates 
deadweight losses arising from information asymmetry between firms and external shareholders. Extending this line of 
research, we document a significant positive relation between conditional conservatism and information asymmetry in 
general. 
Third, this study contributes to the SOX literature by providing evidence that the positive relation between conditional 
conservatism and equity cost disappears following the implementation of SOX, which reconfirms that the relation 
operates through the informational effect of conservatism. Our research also lends credence to SOX’s intended purpose 
to reduce information asymmetry and enhance information quality.  
Finally, our study also has practical implications. It informs deliberations regarding the economic influence of 
accounting conservatism that the FASB and IASB recently removed as a fundamental characteristic of financial 
information in favor of neutrality. Our findings imply that conditional conservatism imposes costs on both stock market 
investors and managers, thus pointing to a legitimate yet neglected rationale for managers to disfavor conditional 
conservatism – it creates unexpected negative earnings shocks and generates new information asymmetry among 
investors, both of which enhance the cost of equity and dampens stock prices. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes prior literature and theory development. Section 3 explains our measures 
and research design. Section 4 reports the main testing results. Section 5 presents robustness checks, and Section 6 
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concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
2.1 The Information Precision Effect of Conditional Conservatism 
Most analytical studies demonstrate that conditional accounting conservatism improves information quality by 
providing more accurate signals (Fan & Zhang, 2012), alleviating dysfunctional earnings manipulations (Chen, Hemmer, 
& Zhang, 2007; Gao, 2011), limiting false signaling and free-riding by bad firms (Nan & Wen, 2011), and promoting 
timely good news disclosures (Guay & Verrecchia, 2007). Whereas Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan (2009) 
argue that conditional conservatism conveys news about income-decreasing events at the cost of downward-biased 
estimation and thus reduces its information content, Gao (2011) demonstrates that in the presence of managerial 
opportunism (e.g., earnings management), the optimal measurement rule is conservatism since it helps cancel off 
upward bias and leads to more accurate estimation than a neutrality convention (Gox & Wagenhofer, 2009).  
By focusing on improved information quality, prior empirical studies on conditional conservatism and the cost of equity 
report insignificant or negative relations between them (Francis et al., 2004; Li, 2010; Garcia Lara et al., 2011). Using 
Basu’s (1997) conditional conservatism measure based on investors’ asymmetric responses to good and bad earnings 
news, Francis et al. (2004) fail to find a significant association between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity. 
Also using Basu’s (1997) measure, Li (2010) examines the cost of capital effect of conditional conservatism in 
international debt and equity market settings, and reports that firms domiciled in countries with more conservative 
reporting systems have lower cost of equity. Garcia Lara et al. (2011) also report a significantly negative relation by 
adopting a stock return-based conditional conservatism measure, the CR ratio.  
These existing studies mainly employ the theoretical models of Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007), Guay and Verrecchia 
(2007), and Lambert et al. (2007), and argue that more timely bad earnings news reporting via conservatism increases 
average information precision among investors about expected cash flows, which reduces the covariance between a 
firm’s stock return and the market return and thus lowers the cost of equity capital. However, in a recent theoretical 
paper, Johnstone (in press) analytically demonstrates that the logic underlying these prior theories is misleading in the 
sense that (i) the best available information can sometimes leave decision makers less certain about future events, and 
(ii) even if better information precision brings greater certainty among investors, more precise bad news could lower 
expected payoffs and thus increase the cost of equity.  
Consistent with Johnstone’s (in press) argument, another pitfall in prior theoretical studies is that they only focus on 
covariance. Given unchanged covariance, if more precise information lowers investors’ cash flow expectation, which is 
associated with macroeconomic trends, it may increase the cost of equity. For instance, if more precise information of 
timely earnings loss has a systematic economy-wide component by mirroring macroeconomic figures and/or projecting 
downward market-wide uncertainty into a firm’s earnings numbers, then it should hold the potential to increase the cost 
of equity. Crawley (2012) indicates that aggregate conditional conservatism increases the response of macroeconomic 
indicators to negative economic news and enhances its negative relation with the federal funds rate. Jorgensen, Li, and 
Sadkay (2012) argue (but do not directly test) that conditional conservatism increases aggregate earnings dispersion, 
which reflects systematic economic uncertainty and increases expected return. The evidence and reasoning suggest that 
more precise and timely information about bad news recognition has a systematic risk component, which goes hand in 
hand with its effect of lowering payoff expectations as suggested by Johnstone (in press) to increase the cost of equity 
capital. Moreover, conditional conservatism especially captures bad earnings news shocks, which are reflected in a large 
magnitude of negative shocks of earnings downside risk. Luo, Ma, and Wu (2014) show that earnings downside risk 
measured by the lower partial moment of earnings reflects macroeconomic downward trends and is positively 
associated with the cost of equity. Overall, the above analyses collectively suggest that conditional conservatism can 
increase the cost of equity due to more precision in revealing bad news of negative earnings shocks. 
2.2 The Information Asymmetry Effect of Conditional Conservatism 
Most prior studies relevant to the association between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity implicitly assume 
market efficiency and perfect competition (e.g., Francis et al., 2004; Hughes, Liu, & Liu, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2011; 
Lambert et al., 2012). Specifically, Hughes et al. (2007) and Lambert et al. (2012) observe that under these assumptions, 
there is no opportunity for information asymmetry to influence the cost of equity and only information precision can be 
priced. For example, Hughes et al. (2007) argue that the pricing of asymmetric information in a competitive market as 
claimed by Easley and O’Hara (2004) is a “misperception”. Without these assumptions, however, i.e., in a less perfectly 
competitive setting, information asymmetry may play a role in affecting the cost of equity. Several theoretical studies 
claim that public disclosures can trigger private information acquisition and increase opinion divergence and 
information asymmetries among investors (Kim & Verrecchia, 1991; Demski & Feltham, 1994; McNichols & Trueman, 
1994). Investors with an information advantage have a stronger influence on stock price, and investors with less 
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sophisticated information processing ability and/or with an information disadvantage will thus require higher 
compensation to enter the market and to trade with better-informed counterparties (e.g., Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; 
Verrecchia, 2001; Easley, Hvidkjaer, & O’Hara, 2002; Easley & O’Hara, 2004). Consistent with this reasoning, recent 
empirical and theoretical works such as Gow et al. (2011) and Lambert et al. (2012) argue that higher precision of 
reported (earnings) information complements private information acquired by sophisticated investors (i.e., discourages 
them from acquiring private information), leading to higher opinion heterogeneity and more rather than less information 
asymmetry. Armstrong et al. (2011), Gow et al. (2011), and Akins, Ng, and Verdi (2012) document consistent evidence 
that information asymmetry increases the cost of capital when the market is less than perfectly competitive (Note 4). 
While conditional conservatism increases information quality and thereby enhances outsiders’ ability to verify 
information provided by insiders (Watts, 2003), this enhanced information precision can alternatively cause a greater 
heterogeneity of opinions and generate new information asymmetry among external shareholders as stock market 
investors are more sensitive to sporadic, unexpected, and negative earnings news (Rogers et al., 2009). Therefore, we 
expect that, on net, conditional conservatism increases information asymmetry and equity cost via its information 
asymmetry effect in less than perfectly competitive settings. When the market is imperfect beyond a certain level, the 
information asymmetry effect of conditional conservatism may add to its information precision effect and lead to a 
larger increase in equity cost, although this information asymmetry effect should be nonexistent in a perfect market.  
In summary, given the fact that conditional conservatism leads to high information quality, high quality information 
may not necessarily lead to low cost of equity. The key insight is that conservative reporting reveals bad news more 
precisely. Such precise revealing of bad news could possibly increase the cost of equity by (i) inducing a pessimistic 
expectation of fundamental payoffs (the information precision effect) and (ii) entailing additional asymmetric 
information among investors (the information asymmetry effect), especially in an imperfect market. Prior studies on the 
relation between conservatism and the cost of equity capital largely neglect these two aspects inherent in the 
information quality effect of conditional conservatism. Our work is therefore set on investigating the relation between 
conditional conservatism and the cost of equity via these new informational perspectives. 
3. Measurements and Research Methodology 
Two necessary requirements for studying conditional conservatism and its relation with the cost of equity from the 
informational perspective are that (i) the conditional conservatism measure should be free of the confounding impact of 
stock market information and (ii) the realized equity return as a proxy for the ex ante cost of equity should be net of 
unexpected cash flow shocks ex post. The reason is that both considerations could possibly induce spurious results and 
biased inferences about the association between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity. Specifically, the 
conditional conservatism measure should not endogenously incorporate stock return data, which already impound the 
effects of information precision and information asymmetry and their feedbacks to firms’ and investors’ investment 
behaviors. This consideration is critical especially when the cost of equity is measured by stock returns; otherwise, a 
potential mechanical relation may arise by construction. For the same reason, it is important to control for unexpected 
cash flow shocks (cash flow news) embedded in realized stock returns when measuring investors’ expected returns for 
equity investment. Prior evidence suggests that conditional conservatism is closely related to cash flow news (e.g., 
Callen, Segal, & Hope, 2010; Kim & Pevzner, 2010; Srivastava & Sunder, 2011) that is reflected in stock prices (Note 
5). Cash flow news may also subsume private information feedback (Gao & Liang, 2011) and twist with the information 
asymmetry effect (Gow et al., 2011). Therefore, empirical tests involving equity returns without controlling for cash 
flow news may yield spurious inferences about the impact of conditional conservatism on the cost of equity.  
For these reasons, we use realized excess stock returns that explicitly control for cash flow news to measure the cost of 
equity and employ accounting-based conditional conservatism measures immune from asset market influences. Both 
treatments are amenable to our research purpose of having a comprehensive examination of conditional conservatism’s 
impact on equity cost from the perspectives of the information precision effect and information asymmetry effect. In 
this sense, our measures are supplements to rather than substitutes for existing proxies for conditional conservatism and 
the cost of equity.  
3.1 The Conditional Conservatism Measure 
In the main tests, our accounting-based conditional conservatism measure CON is defined as the average of relative 
accumulated non-operational accruals (CON_Acm) and relative earnings skewness (CON_Skew). CON_Acm is negative 
one times the ratio of accumulated non-operating accruals to accumulated total assets, with both computed using a 
moving average of the current and prior two years for each firm-year observation, and 
Non-operating accruals = Total accruals - Δaccounts receivable (Compustat RECT)       (1) 
    - Δinventories (Compustat INVT) - Δprepaid expenses (Compustat XPP)  
     + Δaccounts payable (Compustat AP) + Δtaxes payable (Compustat TXT) 
Applied Finance and Accounting                                          Vol. 2, No. 1; 2016 
74 
This measure follows Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Zhang (2008) and captures bad earnings news reporting via 
non-operational accruals, for example, those arising from restructuring charges and asset write-downs. However, this is 
a noisy measure for conditional conservatism (Ryan, 2006). Presumably, it also captures unconditional conservatism 
(e.g., pooling vs. purchase accounting), (real) earnings management, the stock option expense, etc.  
CON_Skew is negative one times the ratio of the sum of 10 and earnings skewness to the sum of 10 and operating cash 
flow (OCF) skewness, where skewness is estimated using a rolling window of 20 quarters with a minimum requirement 
of 12 quarters of data. This measure derives from Basu (1995) and adapts the negative skewness measure in Zhang 
(2008) to ensure that higher skewness indicates higher degree of conditional conservatism. We deflate earnings 
skewness by OCF skewness to control for the influence of shocks in the cash flow. Since CON_Acm and CON_Skew are 
both noisy proxies for conditional conservatism and may capture non-conservatism elements such as big baths, we use 
their average CON to help mitigate potential measurement errors. In robustness tests, we examine CON_Acm and 
CON_Skew separately. We also employ negative earnings skewness, Skew, defined as the difference between the 
skewnesses of OCF and earnings estimated over a 20-quarter rolling window (Callen et al., 2010), and CONA, defined 
as the average of Skew and CON_Acm, as alternative conditional conservatism measures for robustness checks.  
3.2 The Cost of Equity Measure 
Our cost of equity measure controls for the effect of cash flow news by subtracting it from realized excess stock returns, 
extending the methodology in McInnis (2010) and Ogneva (2012) (Note 6). Specifically, we calculate cash flow news 
(Ne) as follows. First, we estimate earnings surprises (SURP) from a time-series earnings prediction model augmented 
by the economic determinants of earnings, assuming that annual earnings for firm i follow an AR (1) process. We use a 
rolling window of five years to fit model (2) below by Fama and French (1997) industry classifications: 
EARNit+1 = β0 + β1EARNit + β2SALEit + β3SIZEit + εit+1                                 (2) 
where EARNit+1 (EARNit) is earnings over book equity for the next (current) fiscal year, SALEit is sales over book value 
of total assets for the current fiscal year, and SIZEit is firm size measured as the natural logarithm of market equity at the 
current fiscal year-end. 
Earnings surprise SURPit+1 is then calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted EARN times the 
book value of equity, which is scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the month. We obtain cash flow 
news from monthly cross-sectional regressions of excess stock returns on contemporaneous earnings surprises using a 
linear OLS specification. Cash flow news (Neit+1) is calculated as the product of SURPit+1 and its estimated coefficient 
from the following models: 
R
raw
it+1 = α0 + α1SURPit+1 + εit+1                                               (3) 
 Neit+1 = ά1SURPit+1                                                              (4) 
where R
raw
 is monthly excess return and ά1 is the estimated α1 in model (3). We use the next month’s excess return 
adjusted for cash flow news Rit+1 as the cost of equity capital proxy (i.e., Rit+1 = α0 + εit+1 = R
raw
it+1 - Neit+1).   
3.3 Measures for Information Precision and Information Precision 
Following the literature, we use three measures for information asymmetry: average bid-ask spread IRisk, average daily 
high and low spread HLSpread, and private information trading Itrade. IRisk is defined as the average daily percentage 
bid-ask spread over the 12 months prior to the current fiscal year-end, HLSpread refers to the average daily high and 
low spread over the 12 months prior to the current fiscal year-end calculated following Corwin and Schultz (2011), and 
Itrade is estimated as in Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) and Ferreira and Laux (2007). Both IRisk and 
HLSpread reflect information asymmetry in general, while Itrade denotes information asymmetry arising from 
speculators’ information hunting. We use IRisk in the main tests and employ HLSpread and Itrade in robustness checks. 
Measuring the information precision associated with conditional conservatism is not as easy. The traditional measure for 
information precision (quality) is accrual quality Acc, the volatility of residual accruals estimated from an accrual 
prediction model. However, Acc reflects information precision of both and bad earnings news. Therefore, it cannot 
accurately capture the information precision of negative earnings shocks conveyed by conditional conservatism, which 
should be only relevant to the downside volatility of accruals or earnings. We thus adopt the following downside risk 
measures used in Luo et al. (2014), ERisk and AERisk, to capture the information precision of conditional conservatism 
about bad earnings shocks. ERisk refers to the downside risk of residual accruals from an accrual prediction model, and 
is calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of one plus the accrual root lower partial moment over one plus the 
accrual root upper partial moment (Note 7). Similarly, AERisk measures the downside risk of residual earnings 
estimated from an earnings prediction model, and calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of one plus the root 
lower partial moment of return on assets (ROA) over one plus the root upper partial moment of ROA.  
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Both ERisk and AERisk are significantly positively associated with accrual quality Acc (as shown in Table 1 later). Luo 
et al. (2014) report that earnings and accrual downside risk measures are also positively associated with other available 
information quality measure such as predictability and timeliness, suggesting that they are valid measures for 
information precision of negative earnings shocks associated with conditional conservatism. Since accrual-based 
downside risk ERisk is the main source of earnings downside risk and drives its relation with the cost of capital (Luo et 
al. 2014), we use ERisk in our main tests, and use AERisk (and simple earnings volatility) in robustness checks. 
3.4 The Asset Pricing Methodology 
Our main approach to examining the relation between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity capital follows 
standard asset pricing methods including the hedging portfolio analysis, the firm-level Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional 
regression, and the portfolio-level two-stage cross-sectional regression (2SCSR) analysis, as elaborated below. We also 
employ other approaches such as the pooled OLS regression in robustness checks.  
We first use a hedging portfolio approach that buys (sells) stocks with high (low) conditional conservatism measures to 
assess the association of conditional conservatism with the cost of equity (excess equity returns adjusted for cash flow 
news) (Note 8). Specifically, for each month, stocks are assigned to one of five portfolios based on a firm’s most recent 
conditional conservatism measure CON, with at least four months lag and portfolio 1 (5) containing firms with the 
lowest (highest) level of CON. The monthly return difference between the highest (portfolio 5) and lowest (portfolio 1) 
CON portfolios is computed with a significantly positive (negative) mean difference indicating a positive (negative) 
relation between CON and the cost of equity capital. 
To control for other factors that may influence the CON-return relation, we regress firm-specific excess returns adjusted 
for cash flow news on CON and other firm characteristics. We match annual CON estimates with monthly returns in the 
next 12 months starting four months after the fiscal year-end. For example, for firms with fiscal year t ending in 
December, we collect monthly returns data from April of calendar year t+1 to March of calendar year t+2. We estimate 
the following cross-sectional regression model and its simplified variations by month and then average the coefficient 
parameters following the procedures in Fama and MacBeth (1973): 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit + β2Betait + β3Sizeit + β4BMit + β5Momentumit + β6TCAit                   (5) 
                + β7Accit + β8 Low_Pricedit + μit+1       
where CONit is the conditional conservatism measure for stock i in month t, Rit+1 refers to return adjusted for cash flow 
news for stock i in month t +1, RFt+1 is the U.S. one-month T-bill rate in month t +1, Betait refers to the beta of stock i 
for month t estimated as in Fama and French (1992), Sizeit is defined as the natural logarithm of market capitalization of 
stock i for month t as in Fama and French (1992), BMit is the natural logarithm of the ratio of book to market equity of 
stock i for month t as in Fama and French (1992), Momentumit refers to the buy-and-hold return of stock i for the 
11-month period ending one month prior to the current month t, TCAit is total accrual measured in the balance sheet 
approach scaled by total assets following Sloan (1996) (Note 9). Accit is the decile ranking of accrual quality from Kim 
and Qi (2010) and Ogneva (2012) (Note 10), and Low_Pricedit is an indicator variable for returns with two adjacent 
prices of less than five U.S. dollars as defined in Kim and Qi (2010). Among the control variables, Beta, Size and BM 
are commonly accepted factors that affect expected stock returns. We include Momentum to ensure that the results are 
not attributable to conservative firms with previous negative returns. Since one CON component (CON_Acm) is 
accrual-based, we control for TCA and Acc to ensure that the relation between conditional conservatism and equity 
returns is robust to the pricing effects of TCA and Acc (Khan, 2008; Ogneva, 2012; Kim & Qi, 2010). Low_Priced is 
also controlled along with Acc since penny stocks substantially impact Acc’s pricing (Kim & Qi, 2010). Following 
Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010), we include industry dummies in cross-sectional regressions to address the 
concern that missing industry effects may bias the coefficient estimates. 
We further conduct a 2SCSR analysis on Fama-French 25 size and BM portfolios to examine possible risk-based asset 
pricing implications of conditional conservatism. In the first stage, we construct a conservatism factor RCON, which 
represents return on a zero-investment portfolio buying the top 20 percent of firms and selling the bottom 20 percent of 
firms sorted by CON, and estimate the multivariate betas from time-series regressions of excess returns for a portfolio 
of firms according to size and BM, Rqt - RFt, on contemporaneous portfolio returns to the Fama-French and momentum 
factors along with RCON. The first-stage models are: 
Rqt - RFt = b0 + bq,RM-RF(RMt - RFt) + bq,SMBSMBt + bq,HMLHMLt + bq,RCONRCONt + εqt  (6) 
Rqt - RFt = b0 + bq,RM-RF(RMt - RFt) + bq,SMBSMBt + bq,HMLHMLt  (7) 
+ bq,UMDUMDt + bq,RCONRCONt + εqt 
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where Rqt refers to average excess return on the size-BM portfolio q in month t, RCONqt is the return on CON factor as 
explained above, RMt - RFt refers to the return on market portfolio (CRSP value-weighted) minus the risk free rate 
proxied by the U.S. one-month T-bill rate RFt, SMBt is the return on a factor-mimicking hedge portfolio for size as in 
Fama and French (1993), HMLt is the return on a factor-mimicking hedge portfolio for BM as in Fama and French 
(1993), and UMDt refers to the return on a factor-mimicking hedge portfolio for momentum as in Carhart (1997). 
The second stage estimates the cross-sectional regressions of mean excess factor returns on the factor loadings 
estimated in the first-stage time-series regressions as follows: 
Rqt - RFt = a0 + a1bq,RM_RF + a2bq,SMB + a3bq,HML + a4bq,RCON + ηqt                          (8) 
Rqt - RFt = a0 + a1bq,RM_RF + a2bq,SMB + a3bq,HML + a4bq,UMD + a5bq,RCON + ηqt                      (9) 
where bq,RM_RF, bq,SMB, bq,HML, bq,UMD, and bq,RCON are factor loadings estimated in the first stage. If the estimated 
coefficients for bq,RCON are significantly positive (negative), then RCON is deemed to reflect a priced factor with a 
positive (negative) risk premium. 
4. Data and the Relation between Conditional Conservatism and the Cost of Equity 
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample consists of all common stocks traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX during the period from January 
1986 to December 2008. Daily and monthly returns and the U.S. one-month T-bill rates are obtained from CRSP, with 
corresponding accounting data retrieved from COMPUSTAT. Conditional conservatism estimates are winsorized to the 
1% and 99% percentiles of Fama and French (1997) industry distributions for each fiscal year to abate potential biases 
from outliers. The final sample includes 62,833 firm-year observations with conditional conservatism estimates. Table 1 
reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the main tests. Panel A shows that the means (medians) of CON and its 
two components, CON_Acm and CON_Skew, are -0.5035 (-0.5129), 0.0085 (0.0116), and -1.0155 (-1.0303), 
respectively (Note 11). Panel B indicates that the Pearson and Spearman correlations of CON with CON_Skew and 
CON_Acm are significantly positive, within the range of 0.1338 to 0.9913, lending construction validity to CON as a 
representative conditional conservatism measure. Nonetheless, the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between CON_Skew 
and CON_Acm is only 0.0018 (0.0623), with the former statistically insignificant, which is not necessarily inappropriate 
since they gauge conditional conservatism from different dimensions: CON_Skew measures conservatism arising from 
earnings and operating accruals, while CON_Acm captures conservatism arising from non-operating accruals. In 
addition, all Pearson and Spearman correlations of conditional conservatism measures with total accruals (TCA) are 
significantly negative, whereas those with accrual quality (Acc) are significantly positive. This suggests that 
accounting-based conditional conservatism measures convey information about TCA and ACC, but such information is 
not exactly the same as (and therefore cannot be subsumed by) that contained in total accruals and accrual quality of 
firms. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for conditional conservatism and firm characteristic variables 
Panel A: Summary Statistics          
 CON CON_Skew CON_Acm TCA Acc IRisk ERisk Size Beta BM Momentum 
Mean -0.5035 -1.0155 0.0085 0.0099 0.0534 0.0278 -0.0063 2411.3615 1.2276 0.6252 0.1570 
STD 0.7700 0.2000 1.5200 0.1200 0.0500 0.0400 0.1200 12724.7500 0.3500 0.4400 0.5900 
Q1 -0.5780 -1.1477 -0.0231 -0.0316 0.0224 0.0061 -0.0544 55.9520 0.9648 0.3256 -0.1667 
Median -0.5129 -1.0303 0.0116 0.0080 0.0379 0.0170 -0.0076 228.4739 1.1726 0.5167 0.0667 
Q3 -0.4291 -0.8726 0.0425 0.0546 0.0664 0.0362 0.0393 1007.6076 1.4421 0.7952 0.3403 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix          
 CON CON_Skew CON_Acm TCA Acc IRisk ERisk Size Beta BM Momentum 
CON 1 0.1338 0.9913 -0.0068 0.2244 0.0174 0.2947 -0.0054 0.0236 -0.0005 0.0016 
CON_Skew 0.9129 1 0.0018 -0.0318 0.2552 0.0663 0.0681 -0.0426 0.1595 0.0434 0.0255 
CON_Acm 0.4001 0.0623 1 -0.0027 0.0493 -0.0158 0.2887 0.0002 0.0027 -0.0063 -0.0017 
TCA -0.0560 -0.0375 -0.0386 1 -0.0451 -0.0254 -0.3036 -0.0018 0.0184 -0.1140 0.0112 
Acc 0.2620 0.2780 0.0547 -0.0198 1 0.0419 0.0185 -0.0650 0.3004 -0.0714 0.0119 
IRisk 0.0546 0.0942 -0.0699 0.0095 0.1154 1 0.0054 -0.1180 0.0588 0.3537 0.0653 
ERisk 0.1447 0.0629 0.2484 -0.3270 0.0026 -0.0112 1 0.0234 0.0099 0.0022 0.0268 
Size -0.1047 -0.1442 0.0564 0.0221 -0.2798 -0.7671 0.0448 1 -0.1202 -0.1248 -0.0019 
Beta 0.1474 0.1531 0.0518 0.0198 0.3271 0.0808 -0.0340 -0.2068 1 0.0114 0.0331 
BM 0.0093 0.0305 -0.0622 -0.1314 -0.0880 0.3620 -0.0090 -0.4294 -0.0036 1 0.0619 
Momentum -0.0051 -0.0162 0.0213 0.0019 -0.0717 0.0018 0.0412 0.1026 -0.0527 0.0472 1 
Description: This table reports descriptive statistics for conditional conservatism measures and firm characteristic 
variables for the sample period of January 1986 to December 2008. Panel A shows summary statistics, and Panel B 
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presents Pearson and Spearman correlations among these variables in the upper and lower triangles, respectively. 
Highlighted numbers are statistically significant at the 10% level. Variable definitions are available in Sections 3 and 4. 
4.2 Hedging Portfolio Analysis Results 
Table 2 reports the hedging portfolio results for the average excess returns adjusted for cash flow news and abnormal 
returns represented by alphas as well as other measures that have influences on the expected stock returns or equity cost. 
We construct five CON-sorted portfolios rebalanced each month, with portfolio 1 (5) representing observations with the 
smallest (largest) CON. The average cash flow news adjusted excess return (Ret) and three abnormal return measures 
(CAPM alpha, 3-factor alpha, 4-factor alpha) all increase monotonically across CON portfolios, with average mean 
differences between the top and bottom portfolios as 0.0053, 0.0044, 0.0048, and 0.0056, respectively, all statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. A similar pattern is observed for Mom. In contrast, total accrual (TCA) declines 
monotonically with CON, with an average of 0.0181 for portfolio 1 and 0.0005 for portfolio 5. The mean difference of 
-0.0176 is statistically significant, suggesting that CON is negatively correlated with TCA, consistent with evidence in 
Table 1. The pattern for accrual quality Acc, although non-monotonic, generally exhibits a positive relation with CON 
where the mean difference between portfolios 1 and 5 is 0.0338, statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
Overall, Table 2 provides evidence that a higher CON is associated with higher expected returns (alphas or cash flow 
news adjusted excess returns), implying that larger conditional conservatism increases the cost of equity. Moreover, 
CON is shown to be significantly correlated with return momentum, total accruals, and accrual quality, indicating a 
need to control for these variables in multivariate cross-sectional regressions. 
Table 2. Conditional conservatism-sorted portfolio analysis for average monthly cash flow news adjusted excess returns, 
alphas, momentum, total accruals, and accrual quality 
Portfolio Ret CAPM alpha 3-factor alpha 4-factor alpha Momentum TCA Acc 
1 0.0074 0.0031 0.0015 0.0030 0.1354 0.0181 0.0431 
2 0.0088 0.0044 0.0027 0.0041 0.1425 0.0132 0.0402 
3 0.0096 0.0049 0.0035 0.0053 0.1511 0.0129 0.0455 
4 0.0108 0.0058 0.0047 0.0062 0.175 0.0093 0.0569 
5 0.0127 0.0074 0.0063 0.0085 0.1772 0.0005 0.0769 
















Description: The table compares cash flow news adjusted excess returns, abnormal returns (alphas), momentum, total 
accruals, and accrual quality across portfolios formed on conditional conservatism (CON) for a sample of 62,833 
observations of firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX with available CON measures over the period of 
January 1986 to December 2008. At the end of each month, firm-month observations are assigned into five portfolios 
based on the firm’s most recent CON known four months prior to the current date. Portfolio 1 (5) contains firms with 
the smallest (largest) CON. Average differences between the top and bottom portfolios are reported in the row (5-1). The 
t-statistics for these differences are computed with a Newey and West (1987) correction. Ret refers to return excluding 
cash flow news and risk free rate, CAPM alpha, 3-factor alpha, and 4-factor alpha refer to abnormal returns from 
CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, and Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, respectively, TCA is total 
accruals (Sloan, 1996) and Acc is accrual quality (Kim & Qi, 2010). 
4.3 Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Regression Results 
Table 3 presents results for the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly cash flow news adjusted excess 
returns on CON and other firm risk characteristics including Beta, Size, BM, Mom, TCA, and Acc. Following Kim and 
Qi (2010), we also include Low_Priced, an indicator for low-priced shares along with Acc. Panels A and B show results 
without and with controls for Fama and French (1997) industry effects, respectively. 
Consistent with results from the portfolio analysis, cross-sectional regression loadings on CON are consistently positive 
and significant, with coefficients (t-statistics) of 0.0138 (3.54) and 0.0098 (3.32) in univariate regressions, without and 
with controlling for industry effects, respectively (Note 12). After Beta, Size, and BM are added as further controls, 
CON coefficients remain significantly positive, with corresponding coefficients (t-statistics) of 0.0091 (3.42) and 
0.0063 (2.77) in Panels A and B, respectively. Moreover, CON’s effect on the cost of equity is not subsumed by either 
Mom, TCA, or Acc when they enter into the regressions individually or collectively, suggesting that CON provides 
incremental information beyond that from momentum, total accruals, and accrual quality. Therefore, results in Table 3 
reconfirm that conditional conservatism is positively related to the cost of equity capital, which cannot be captured by 
standard risk factors and is not contributable to total accruals and/or accrual quality effects. The relation between 
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conditional conservatism and the cost of equity is also robust to industrial characteristics. 
Table 3. Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly cash flow news adjusted excess returns on conditional conservatism 
 Panel A:  Regressions without Industry Dummies 
Model CON Beta Size BM Momentum TCA Acc Low_Priced Avg. Adj. R-square 
1 0.0138        0.0017 
 (3.54)***         
2 0.0091 0.0029 -0.0014 0.0022     0.0256 
 (3.42)*** (0.92) (-2.75)*** (2.46)**      
3 0.0088 0.0019 -0.0015 0.0022 0.0022    0.0325 
 (3.41)*** (0.68) (-3.01)*** (2.52)** (1.24)     
4 0.0085 0.0031 -0.0014 0.0017  -0.0171   0.0267 
 (3.24)*** (1.01) (-2.78)*** (1.97)**  (-5.88)***    
5 0.0115 0.0023 -0.0021 0.0026   0.0324 -0.0158 0.0345 
 (5.24)*** (0.77) (-4.85)*** (3.45)***   (2.45)** (-8.46)***  
6 0.0107 0.0018 -0.0022 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0169 0.0295 -0.0158 0.0419 
 (4.94)*** (0.65) (-5.11)*** (2.97)*** (0.03) (-5.78)*** (2.38)** (-9.30)***  
Panel B:  Regressions with Industry Dummies 
Model CON Beta Size BM Momentum TCA Acc Low_Priced Avg. Adj. R-square 
1 0.0098        0.0367 
 (3.32)***         
2 0.0063 0.0025 -0.0013 0.0025     0.0535 
 (2.77)*** (0.95) (-2.72)*** (3.65)***      
3 0.0061 0.0018 -0.0014 0.0026 0.0008    0.0587 
 (2.73)*** (0.74) (-2.97)*** (3.77)*** (0.48)     
4 0.0059 0.0027 -0.0013 0.0021  -0.0151   0.0544 
 (2.59)*** (1.04) (-2.75)*** (3.07)***  (-5.75)***    
5 0.0106 0.0032 -0.0023 0.0025   0.0103 -0.0159 0.0626 
 (5.01)*** (1.26) (-5.35)*** (3.89)***   (0.96) (-8.90)***  
6 0.0099 0.0028 -0.0024 0.0023 -0.0013 -0.0156 0.0087 -0.0164 0.0682 
  (4.71)*** (1.19) (-5.60)*** (3.54)*** (-0.85) (-5.62)*** (0.85) (-10.00)***   
Description: This table presents estimation results for Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly cash flow news adjusted 
excess returns against conditional conservatism (CON) and other firm characteristics including Beta, Size, BM, 
Momentum, TCA, Acc, and a low-priced return indicator variable Low_Priced for the period of January 1986 to 
December 2008. The reported estimates are time-series averages of coefficients from 276 monthly cross-sectional 
regressions. The t-statistics are calculated from Newey and West (1987) standard errors of these monthly averages. 
Panel A reports results without controlling for Fama and French (1997) industry effect, whereas Panel B reports results 
after controlling for industry effect by adding dummies for the Fama-French industries. Monthly cash flow news 
adjusted excess return is calculated as the raw return less cash flow news and the risk free return proxied by U.S. 
one-month T-bill rate. Beta is estimated following the procedure in Fama and French (1992). Size is the natural log of 
market capitalization. BM is the natural log of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. We match 
Beta, Size, and BM measures with return data following Fama and French (1992). Momentum is an 11-month return in 
the prior-year omitting the most recent month. CON is the average of firm-year conditional conservatism measure 
CON_Acm and CON_Skew, TCA is total accruals (Sloan, 1996), Acc is the accrual quality measure used in Kim and Qi 
(2010) and Ogneva (2012). We match annual estimates of CON, TCA, and Acc with monthly stock returns in the next 12 
months starting four months after the fiscal year-end. The low-priced return indicator is set to 1 if returns are computed 
using two adjacent prices less than $5 and 0 otherwise. The main models used in Panels A and B are estimated using 
model (5) described in Section 3. 
4.4 Portfolio-Level 2SCSR Results 
To further confirm conditional conservatism’s impact on the cost of equity, we conduct the 2SCSR analysis at the 
portfolio-level, which is less affected by firm-specific characters that may contaminate the underlying relation 
considered. Table 4 reports estimation results for models (6) to (9). Panel A presents the first-stage time-series 
regressions of monthly portfolio excess stock returns adjusted for cash flow news on the CON factor (RCON), Fama and 
French (1993) three factors (RM - RFt, SMB, and HML), and Carhart (1997) momentum factor (UMD). Factor loadings 
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on RCON are significantly positive, with magnitudes (t-statistics) of 0.4725 (4.16) when the three Fama-French factors 
are controlled and 0.3814 (3.41) when the momentum factor is further added. 
Panel B reports results for the second-stage cross-sectional regressions of mean cash flow news adjusted excess 
portfolio returns on factor loadings estimated from the first stage. The coefficients for the factor loadings on RCON, 
βRCON, are significantly positive with magnitudes (t-statistics) of 0.0051 (3.42) and 0.0055 (3.49) when loadings on the 
Fama and French (1993) three factors and Carhart (1997) four factors are controlled, respectively. The last column 
indicates that when βRCON is included, the average adjusted R
2
 jumps from 0.4170 to 0.7566 for the three-factor model 
and from 0.4086 to 0.7530 for the four-factor model. Therefore, evidence from the 2SCSR analysis provides further 
support for the enhancing effect of conditional conservatism on the cost of equity. In the next section, we explore the 
proposed information precision and information asymmetry effects that contribute to the positive conditional 
conservatism and cost of equity relation. 
Table 4. Portfolio-level two-stage cross-sectional regressions 
Panel A:  First-stage Time-series Regressions of Portfolio Returns on Factor Returns 
Model Intercept RM-RF SMB HML UMD RCON Adj. R-square 
1 0.0053 1.0925 0.8475 0.2868   0.7626 
 (4.54)*** (42.25)*** (11.83)*** (4.05)***    
2 0.0031 1.0292 0.7242 0.3330  0.4725 0.7857 
 (3.37)*** (31.14)*** (13.71)*** (4.92)***  (4.16)***  
3 0.0077 1.0457 0.8665 0.2272 -0.2305  0.7834 
 (6.38)*** (41.16)*** (11.96)*** (3.06)*** (-11.26)***   
4 0.0056 1.0003 0.7647 0.2718 -0.2023 0.3814 0.8024 
 (6.74)*** (30.52)*** (14.38)*** (3.83)*** (-11.70)*** (3.41)***  
Panel B:  Second-stage Cross-sectional Regressions of Portfolio Returns on Factor Loadings    
Model Intercept βRM-RF βSMB βHML βUMD βRCON Adj. R-square 
1 0.0250 -0.0184 0.0061 0.0051   0.4170 
 (2.60)*** (-2.42)** (2.21)** (1.95)*    
2 0.0282 -0.0180 -0.0049 0.0091  0.0051 0.7566 
 (4.52)*** (-3.66)*** (1.82) (4.93)***  (3.42)***  
3 0.0263 -0.0214 0.0045 0.007 -0.0090  0.4086 
 (2.68)*** (-2.53)** (1.33) (1.98)** (-0.61)   
4 0.0275 -0.0159 -0.0044 0.0079 0.0050 0.0055 0.7530 
  (4.36)*** (-2.90)*** (-1.59) (3.45)*** (-0.51) (3.49)***   
Description: This table shows results of Fama-French 25 portfolio-level two-stage cross-sectional regressions for a 
sample over the 1986-2008 period. Panel A reports average factor loadings and adjusted R
2
 of the first-stage time-series 
regressions of monthly portfolio cash flow news adjusted excess returns against the three Fama–French factors, a 
momentum factor, and a conservatism factor RCON, using models (6) and (7) described in Section 3. We construct 
RCON as the return on a zero-investment portfolio by buying the top 20 percent of firms and selling the bottom 20 
percent of firms in terms of CON. Panel B reports estimated coefficients for the second-stage cross-sectional regressions 
of excess portfolio returns on portfolio factor loadings estimated from the first stage, according to models (8) and (9) in 
Section 3. 
4.5 Information Precision and Information Asymmetry Effects of Conditional Conservatism and Its Relation with the 
Cost of Equity 
We move on to investigate how conditional conservatism affects the cost of equity through its information precision 
effect and information asymmetry effect. We first employ a portfolio approach to examine how they mediate the relation 
between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity. Specifically, we construct five CON-based portfolios and 
check the levels of information asymmetry IRisk and information precision (about negative earnings shocks) ERisk in 
each portfolio. If high-CON portfolios on average have significantly higher IRisk and/or ERisk, then we can conclude 
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that conditional conservatism can generally elevate the information asymmetry and/or information precision of negative 
earnings shocks. We then use the following Fama-MacBeth model and its simplified variations to investigate both 
effects in multivariate regressions: 
Rit+1 - RFt+1 = α + β1CONit + β2Betait + β3Sizeit + β4BMit + β5IRiskit+ β6ERiskit (10) 
+ ∑Industry_Dummies + μit+1 
where Rit+1, RFt+1, Betait, Sizeit, and CONit are defined as in model (5) and Industry_Dummies represents the Fama and 
French (1997) industry classifications. If CON affects the cost of equity capital via information asymmetry and/or 
earnings downside risk, then adding IRisk and/or ERisk should weaken the relation as reflected in the magnitude and 
significance level of the CON coefficient. 
Table 5 reports results from the portfolio analysis and Fama-MacBeth regressions for testing how conditional 
conservatism affects the cost of equity through the information asymmetry and information precision effects. Panel A 
presents mean values of the information asymmetry measure IRisk and the measure for information precision of 
negative earnings shocks ERisk in different CON-sorted portfolios, with portfolio 1 (5) containing observations with the 
smallest (largest) CON. IRisk increases non-monotonically with CON, revealing an asymmetric “V” pattern. It falls 
from 0.0303 in portfolio 1 to 0.0284 in portfolio 2, suggesting that conditional conservatism at lower levels serves to 
reduce information asymmetry. Then, IRisk increases monotonically to 0.0350 in portfolio 5, implying that at higher 
levels, CON increases information asymmetry. The mean difference of IRisk between portfolios 5 and 1 is 0.0047, 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. Therefore, CON is nonlinearly associated with information 
asymmetry, but on average, a positive relation dominates, suggesting that high conditional conservatism can in general 
increase the cost of equity capital via enhancing information asymmetry as suggested by Gow et al. (2011) and Lambert 
et al. (2012). The information precision of negative earnings shocks measure ERisk increases monotonically with CON, 
and the mean difference (t-statistic) between the top and bottom portfolios is 0.0567 (38.95), suggesting that conditional 
conservatism does increase the precision of information regarding negative earnings shocks. Since earnings downside 
risk induces a higher cost of equity (Luo et al., 2014), this evidence suggests that conditional conservatism may increase 
the cost of equity capital through enhancing the precision of negative earnings news.  
Panel B of Table 5 presents estimated results for the Fama-MacBeth regressions using model (10) with fixed industry 
effects. In all models, the coefficients on conditional conservatism CON become much smaller than those in Panel B of 
Table 3 where IRisk and ERisk are not controlled. In particular, the CON coefficients (t-statistics) drop to 0.0053 (2.13) 
and 0.0049 (2.22), respectively, after adding IRisk and ERisk as further controls compared with the figure of 0.0063 
(2.77) in Panel B of Table 3 where only the three Fama-French factors are controlled for. Importantly, the CON 
coefficient falls to 0.0041 when both IRisk and ERisk are controlled, and it is only marginally significant with a 
t-statistic of 1.68. Combined, the findings indicate that information asymmetry and information precision of negative 
earnings shocks partially account for the effect of conditional conservatism on the cost of equity, and they subsume a 
larger portion of loading on conditional conservatism when both are included in the regression model. This evidence 
lends support to the notion that the positive relation between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity operates 
(at least partially) through the effects of information asymmetry and information precision of negative earnings shocks. 
Table 5. Conditional conservatism-sorted portfolio analysis and Fama-MacBeth regression of cash flow news adjusted 
excess returns on conditional conservatism, information asymmetry, and information precision about negative earnings 
shocks. 
Panel A:  Portfolio Analysis           
Portfolio  IRisk ERisk 
1 0.0303 -0.0313 
2 0.0284 -0.0109 
3 0.0310 -0.0108 
4 0.0341 -0.0063 
5 0.0350 0.0254 
(5-1) 0.0047 0.0567 
t-statistic (24.11)*** (38.95)*** 
Panel B:  Fama-MacBeth Regressions with Industry Dummies 
Model CON Beta Size BM IRisk ERisk Avg. Adj. R-square 
1 0.0053 0.0036 -0.0004 0.0022 0.1522  0.0545 
 (2.13)** (1.29) (-0.65) (2.92)*** (4.13)***   
2 0.0049 0.0021 -0.0012 0.0025  0.0152 0.0555 
 (2.22)** (0.80) (-2.73)*** (3.63)***  (5.10)***  
3 0.0041 0.0034 -0.0004 0.0024 0.1595 0.0145 0.0561 
  (1.68)* (1.18) (-0.85) (3.01)*** (4.06)*** (4.32)***   
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Description: This table presents estimation results for testing the information asymmetry and information precision 
effects on the conditional conservatism and cost of equity relation. Panel A reports results from portfolio analyses for 
information asymmetry proxy IRisk and earnings downside risk measure ERisk. At the end of each month, firm-month 
observations are assigned into one of five portfolios based on a firm’s most recent CON known four months prior to the 
current date. Portfolio 1 (5) contains firms with the smallest (largest) CON. Average differences in IRisk and ERisk 
between the top and bottom portfolios are reported in row (5-1). The t-statistics for these differences are computed with 
a Newey-West (1987) correction. Panel B shows results for Fama-MacBeth regressions (model (10) of Section 4) of 
future monthly cash flow news adjusted excess returns on CON, IRisk, ERisk, and other firm characteristics (Beta, Size, 
BM). The reported estimates are time-series averages of the coefficients on CON from 276 monthly cross-sectional 
regressions. Reported t-statistics are calculated from Newey and West (1987) standard errors of these monthly averages.  
4.6 SOX and the Relation between Conditional Conservatism and the Cost of Equity 
Thus far, we have examined how the effects of conditional conservatism on information asymmetry and precision of 
negative earnings shocks affect its association with the cost of equity. If these channels play a role, then the passage of 
SOX provides an ideal setting wherein their influences should change and thus induce alternation in the relation 
between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity capital (Chang, Fernando, & Liao, 2009; Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney, & LaFond, 2009; Amir, Guan, & Livne, 2010) (Note 13). The SOX Act enacted in 2003 is a response to 
allegations of accounting irregularities in Enron and other firms, and it is intended in part to improve the overall 
financial reporting quality of all public firms, enhance information precision, mitigate information asymmetry between 
firms and investors, and improve market efficiency. Whereas several prior studies document increased conditional 
conservatism in the post-SOX period (e.g., Lobo & Zhou, 2006), our design lends itself to further detecting potential 
reductions in equity cost arising from reduced information asymmetry after SOX, thus complementing prior findings. 
With regard to the information precision effect, since SOX increases information transparency for all firms, the 
cross-sectional information precision effect of negative earnings shocks conveyed via conditional conservatism may be 
weakened by the nationwide heightened information precision. This connotes a reduced effect of conservatism on the 
cost of equity in the post-SOX period, ceteris paribus. The SOX passage also decreases information asymmetry and 
shrinks potential mispricing, which further abates the potential information asymmetry effect of conditional 
conservatism on the cost of equity. Based on these arguments, we expect a weakened association between conditional 
conservatism and the cost of equity after the SOX enactment. This serves to provide additional support for the 
informational effects of conditional conservatism on increasing the cost of equity in the pre-SOX period. 
Figure 1 graphically presents the per-year average cash flow news adjusted excess returns to conditional 
conservatism-sorted hedging portfolios. A striking pattern is observed whereby hedging returns are consistently positive 
for most years during the pre-SOX period from 1986 to 2002. The returns become negative from 2004 through 2008, 
the post-SOX period, with generally smaller magnitudes and variability compared with the pre-SOX period. The spike 














Figure 1. Mean differences in cash flow news adjusted excess return  
for conditional conservatism-sorted hedging portfolios by year 
To further examine the influence of SOX on the association between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity, we 
conduct firm-level Fama-MacBeth regressions of cash flow news adjusted excess returns on conditional conservatism 
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CON separately for the pre- and post-SOX periods. We report results in Panels A and B of Table 6. To avoid possible 
noises from transient market reactions to the SOX regulation, we omit the years when SOX was passed (2002) and 
implemented (2003). Panel A reveals that the positive relation between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity 
is driven primarily by observations from the pre-SOX period. In particular, loadings on CON are positive and 
significant in all regressions before the implementation of SOX. Panel B indicates that CON coefficients are generally 
negative and/or insignificant in the post-SOX period, consistent with Figure 1. In summary, results in pre- and 
post-SOX periods collectively corroborate the notion that the passage of SOX diminishes the information asymmetry 
and information precision effects of conditional conservatism on the cross-section of stock returns, resulting in a weak 
relation between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity. 
Table 6. SOX and Fama-MacBeth regressions of cash flow news adjusted excess returns on conditional conservatism 
and firm characteristics with industry dummies 
Panel A:  Fama-MacBeth Regressions in the Pre-SOX Period before 2002 (1986.01-2001.12)       
Model CON Beta Size BM Momentum TCA Acc Low_Priced IRisk ERisk Ave. Adj. R-square 
1 0.0124          0.0334 
 (3.87)***           
2 0.0095 0.0032 -0.0011 0.0028       0.0505 
 (3.62)*** (1.10) (-1.80)* (3.20)***        
3 0.0094 0.0023 -0.0013 0.0027 0.0030      0.0554 
 (3.63)*** (0.89) (-2.02)** (3.17)*** (1.72)*       
4 0.0088 0.0035 -0.0012 0.0022  -0.0198     0.0515 
 (3.36)*** (1.19) (-1.82)* (2.55)**  (-6.02)***      
5 0.0124 0.0032 -0.0020 0.0029   0.0230 -0.0154   0.0611 
 (5.06)*** (1.15) (-3.64)*** (3.51)***   (1.56) (-6.72)***    
6 0.0086 0.0046 -0.0002 0.0026     0.0816  0.0499 
 (2.93)*** (1.45) (-0.31) (2.75)***     (3.55)***   
7 0.0082 0.0028 -0.0011 0.0028      0.0207 0.0523 
 (3.24)*** (0.92) (-1.80)* (3.14)***      (5.84)***  
8 0.0105 0.0061 -0.0013 0.0017 0.0004 -0.0207 0.0115 -0.0206 0.1434 0.0163 0.0684 
 (3.44)*** (2.18)** (-1.94)* (1.69)* (0.20) (-4.80)*** (0.72) (-9.43)*** (5.47)*** (3.57)***  
Panel B:  Fama-MacBeth Regressions in the Post-SOX Period after 2003 (2004.01-2008.12)       
Model CON Beta Size BM Momentum TCA Acc Low_Priced IRisk ERisk Ave. Adj. R-square 
1 -0.0073          0.0449 
 (-1.31)           
2 -0.0062 -0.0046 -0.0005 0.0011       0.0559 
 (-1.60) (-1.14) (-0.91) (0.96)        
3 -0.0063 -0.0045 -0.0007 0.0012 -0.0009      0.0604 
 (-1.58) (-1.18) (-1.11) (1.05) (-0.31)       
4 -0.0058 -0.0043 -0.0006 0.0011  -0.0012     0.0565 
 (-1.55) (-1.06) (-0.95) (0.99)  (-0.28)      
5 0.0046 -0.0025 -0.0022 0.0010   -0.0145 -0.0212   0.0599 
 (-1.19) (-0.63) (-4.35)*** (0.86)   (-1.51) (-7.57)***    
6 -0.0068 -0.0043 0.0003 0.0007     0.3126  0.0595 
 (-1.71)* (-1.09) (-0.57) (0.62)     (2.33)**   
7 -0.0057 -0.0046 -0.0007 0.0010      -0.0002 0.0572 
 (-1.51) (-1.14) (-1.17) (0.83)      (-0.04)  
8 0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0057 -0.0015 -0.0060 -0.0258 0.6457 0.0059 0.0714 
  (-0.71) (-0.38) (-0.73) (0.60) (-2.02)** (-0.35) (-0.61) (-8.98)*** (4.36)*** (-0.89)   
Description: This table presents estimation results for Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly cash flow news adjusted 
excess returns on conditional conservatism (CON), total accruals (TCA), accrual quality (Acc) (along with a low-priced 
return indicator variable Low_Priced), information asymmetry (IRisk), earnings downside risk (ERisk), and firm 
characteristics including Beta, Size, and BM, plus controls for dummies for Fama and French (1997) industries. Panel A 
reports average regression coefficients for the period of January 1986 to December 2001, a period before SOX; Panel B 
reports average coefficients for the period of January 2004 to December 2008, a period after SOX. Reported t-statistics 
are calculated from Newey and West (1987) standard errors of these monthly averages. 
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5. Robustness Checks 
5.1 Alternative Conditional Conservatism Measures 
To check the robustness of our main findings, we use several alternative measures for conditional conservatism. We first 
separately use CON_Skew, CON_Acm, and the ranking of CON, with results qualitatively unchanged. Then we use two 
other conditional conservatism proxies Skew and CONA as introduced in Section 3 and also find qualitatively similar 
results. Nevertheless, one may still be concerned about whether our results still hold when using the traditional 
accounting-based conditional conservatism measures in Basu (1997) and doubt the validity of our findings. To address 
this issue, we try the more classical measure based on the asymmetric persistence of net income in Basu (1997). We 
have to make two extensions to the original measure in Basu (1997) to better fit in our research: (i) to derive a pure 
accounting-based conservatism measure, we use total assets or sales as the deflator for net income instead of using stock 
price; and (ii) to avoid a potentially serious survival bias, we estimate the model of net income changes or levels below 
by quarterly data rather than annual data because at least 12 observations are needed to comparatively and accurately 
estimate the model. We use a rolling window of 16 quarterly observations to estimate models (11) and (12) below. 
∆NIit = β0 + β1DDit-1 + β2∆NIit-1 + β3DDit-1*∆NIit-1 + εit+1 (11) 
NIit = τ0 + τ1Dit-1 + τ2NIit-1 + τ3Dit-1*NIit-1 + ϕit+1 (12) 
where ∆NIit (NIit) refers to the ratio of quarterly net income changes (quarterly net income) to lagged corresponding 
values in total assets ∆ROAit (ROAit), or the ratio of quarterly net income changes (quarterly net income) to lagged 
corresponding values in sales ∆ROSit (ROSit). DDit-1 is the indicator for negative ∆NIit-1, while Dit-1 is the indicator for 
negative NIit-1. We use the rankings of the estimated coefficients β3 or τ3 as the conditional conservatism measure 
because using quarterly earnings data yields noisy coefficient estimations. When ∆ROAit or ROAit is used, the estimated 
conditional conservatism measures from models (11) and (12) are denoted Basu_∆ROAit and Basu_ROAit, respectively. 
When ∆ROSit or ROSit is used, we denote the estimated conditional conservatism measures as Basu_∆ROSit and 
Basu_ROSit, respectively. Table 7 reports the estimation results for our baseline Fama-MacBeth regression tests using 
these alternative conservatism measures. In all univariate and multivariate regressions, Basu_∆ROAit, Basu_∆ROSit, 
Basu_ROAit, and Basu_ROSit are significantly positively associated with the cost of equity capital except for the last 
model where Basu_ROSit is used in the multivariate regression. Therefore, our testing results are generally robust to the 
classical accounting-based conditional conservatism measures based on the asymmetric earnings persistence. 
Table 7. Alternative conditional conservatism measures and Fama-MacBeth regression for the relation between 
conditional conservatism and cash flow news adjusted excess returns 
Model Basu_∆ROA  Basu_∆ROS  Basu_ROA Basu_ROS Beta Size BM Momentum TCA Acc Low_Priced Avg. Adj. R-square 
1 0.0038 
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0.0376 








0.0038 -0.0022 0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0155 0.0157 -0.0152 0.0691 
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(1.64)* 
        8 
   
0.0014 0.0038 -0.0022 0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0171 0.0160 -0.0150 0.0693 
     (1.50) (1.65) * (-5.01)*** (3.03)*** (-0.99) (-5.92)*** (1.44) (-9.25)***   
Description: This table presents estimation results for univariate and multivariate Fama-MacBeth regressions (after 
controlling for industry effect) of monthly cash flow news adjusted excess returns on alternative conditional 
conservatism measures extending the measurement in Basu (1997). Construction of Basu-based conditional 
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conservatism measures are detailed in Section 5. Definitions of other variables are the same as in Tables 3 and  
6. Reported t-statistics are calculated from Newey and West (1987) standard errors. 
5.2 Alternative Cost of Capital Measures 
For alternative measures of the cost of equity, we extend Botosan et al. (2011) and use the analyst forecast error as an 
approximation for cash flow news, which is computed as the difference between the reported annual earnings per share 
less its analyst forecast deflated by the stock price. Using the newly constructed cost of equity measure, we find that the 
baseline results are similar to the reported.  
5.3 Alternative Measures for Information Precision and Information Asymmetry  
We also use the following alternative measures for information asymmetry: (i) the annual average of daily high and low 
spread over the 12 months prior to the current fiscal year-end, HLSpread, calculated following Corwin and Schultz 
(2011); and (ii) private information trading Itrade, calculated following Llorente et al. (2002) and Ferreira and Laux 
(2007). These treatments do not qualitatively change the estimation results. For alternative earnings downside risk 
proxies that reflect the information precision effect, we further adopt earnings volatility and the root lower partial 
moment of ROA AERisk as substitute measures. When these proxies are used, results are consistent with those reported 
in the main tests. 
5.4 Alternative Estimation Methods 
In alternative asset pricing tests, we used pooled OLS regressions instead of the Fama-MacBeth method. We also follow 
McInnis (2010) and drop all return-months in which a firm announces quarterly earnings to reduce the possibility that 
improper adjustments for cash flow news may bias the results. We further add the liquidity beta as a control for the 
liquidity effect. All these schemes deliver findings that are qualitatively similar to the reported. Finally, to address the 
concern that the results for the post-SOX period are driven by the price plump and liquidity depletion during the 2007 to 
2008 financial crisis, we drop the years of 2007 and 2008 from our post-SOX sample period, replicate Panel B of Table 
6, and achieve qualitatively unchanged results. 
6. Conclusion 
Prior studies examine the effect of conditional conservatism on the cost of equity mainly based on the theory that 
improved information quality reduces covariance between a firm’s stock return and the market return, thus decreasing 
the cost of equity. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed and not consistent. In this study, we propose that 
improved information quality regarding bad earnings news as induced by conditional conservatism entails two 
informational consequences: more precise information about negative earnings shocks and heightened information 
asymmetry, both of which may generate economy-wide or market-wide effects and increase the cost of equity. Using 
accounting-based conditional conservatism measures and the cash flow news adjusted stock returns as the proxy for the 
cost of equity, we find a significantly positive relation between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity capital, 
and document evidence that such positive relation (at least partially) operates via the effects of information asymmetry 
and information precision about negative earnings shocks. We also find that the positive association between 
conditional conservatism and the cost of equity disappears in the post-SOX period, consistent with the mitigated 
cross-sectional power of the information precision and information asymmetry effects of conditional conservatism 
engendered by the nationwide improved information quality after SOX. 
This study supplements prior literature that documents an insignificant or negative relation between conditional 
conservatism and the cost of equity. Our findings also augment the SOX literature by documenting a diminution of the 
influence of conditional conservatism in the direction of increasing the cost of capital after the implementation of SOX, 
and connote the importance of considering regulation-induced economy-wide effects. Moreover, the evidence holds 
implications for ongoing deliberations regarding the costs and benefits of conservatism, and further implies that 
conditional conservatism imposes costs on both equity investors and managers, thus pointing to a legitimate rationale 
for managers to disfavor conditional conservatism, which is largely neglected in the literature. 
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Notes 
Note 1. As guidance, the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 
(1980, para. 95) intones that “if two estimates of amounts to be received or paid in the future are about equally likely, 
conservatism dictates using the less optimistic estimate.” The Accounting Principles Board (Statement No. 4, 1970, para. 
171) observes that “managers, investors, and accountants have generally preferred that possible errors in measurement 
be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement of net income and net assets. This has led to the 
convention of conservatism.” 
Note 2. In particular, Caskey and Petersen (2009) argue that the Basu (1997) measure uses the ratio of slope coefficients 
and thus may provide biased estimates because returns are impacted by expected future profits. Other market-based 
conditional conservatism measures, such as the C-score in Khan and Watts (2009), also share a similar weakness. 
Note 3. Botosan et al. (2011) and Ogneva (2012) argue that cash flow news does not cancel out in large samples, and 
therefore, asset pricing tests may induce biases when future realized returns are used to proxy for expected returns. 
Note 4. Akins et al. (2012), Armstrong et al. (2011), and Gow et al. (2011) also find that information asymmetry does 
not affect the cost of equity incremental to market risk if firms’ stocks are traded in highly liquid and competitive 
markets. 
Note 5. Callen et al. (2010) develop the CR ratio, a market-based conservatism measure, from the relation between 
conditional conservatism and cash flow news. 
Note 6. Another measure for cash flow news is earnings forecast error (Botosan et al., 2011; Ogneva, 2012), which is 
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not used in our main tests since it introduces estimation bias. However, in robustness checks, we use it as an alternative 
proxy for cash flow news and obtain similar results. 
Note 7. We utilize accrual downside risk because it is the source of earnings downside risk and has better prediction 
power for negative fundamental operational shocks (Luo et al., 2014). 
Note 8. Henceforth, we use the term return or equity return to represent the excess returns adjusted for cash flow news, 
provided that no confusion arises. 
Note 9. TCAit = (ΔCAit - ΔCLit - ΔCashit + ΔSTDEBTit + ΔTPit - DPit)/ATAit, where ΔCAit is the one-year change in 
current assets, ΔCLit is the one-year change in current liabilities, ΔCashit is the one-year change in cash, ΔSTDEBTit is 
the one-year change in current liabilities, ΔTPit is the income tax payable, DPit is the depreciation expense, and ATAit is 
the average total assets over t-1, t, and t+1. 
Note 10. The accrual quality measure Acc is defined as the decile ranking of the ratio of the standard deviation of the 
residual from the regression TCAit = αt + β0t ATAit + β1tOCFit-1 + β2tOCFit + β3tOCFit+1 + β4tΔREVit + β5tPPEit + εit, 
where TCAit is total current accruals for year t as defined above, OCFit is operating cash flow for year t, ΔREVit is the 
one-year change in revenues, and PPEit is the property, plant and equipment for year t. 
Note 11. The mean (median) of total accruals TCA is 0.0099 (0.0080), which is higher than the documented negative 
values in Sloan (1996) due to different sampling periods. The sampling period in this study is from 1986 to 2008, 
whereas the period in Sloan (1996) is from 1962 to 1991. As we extend the sampling period back to 1962, the mean and 
median of total accruals become negative, in line with Sloan’s (1996) evidence. 
Note 12. Rigorously speaking, model 1 in Panel B is not a univariate regression because it also includes industry 
dummy variables. We call it univariate for simplicity. 
Note 13. Chang et al. (2009) report that SOX reduces the cost of equity capital in general by improving financial 
reporting quality; Skaife et al. (2009) document that SOX reduces equity cost via mandatory disclosures of internal 
control weaknesses; Amir et al. (2010) likewise argue that SOX enhances the negative relation between auditor 
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